State of Utah v. Greg N. Oliver : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
State of Utah v. Greg N. Oliver : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Elizabeth Holbrook; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Oliver, No. 890625 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2287
§ i 
K f U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. <2W> Til IDIIE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GREG N. OLIVER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890625-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for burglary, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 
76-2-202, and theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. section 76-6-404, in the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael R. 
Murphy, Judge, pres iding. 
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 EAST 500 SOUTH, SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 STATE CAPITOL BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
Attorney for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GREG N. OLIVER, 
De fendant/Appe11ant. 
Case No. 890625-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for burglary, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 
76-2-202, and theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. section 76-6-404, in the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael R. 
Murphy, Judge, presiding. 
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 EAST 500 SOUTH, SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 STATE CAPITOL BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
Attorney for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATE OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 13 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. OLIVER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
AND/OR EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN THE 
TRIAL COURT FORCED THE TRIAL TO PROCEED, DESPITE 
THE FACT THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL HAD DONE NO 
PREPARATION 14 
A. PREPARATION OF THE ACCUSED'S DEFENSE 
IS ESSENTIAL TO RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW AND TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL 16 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE 
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE FORCED MR. OLIVER 
TO GO TO TRIAL WITHOUT PREPARATION OF HIS 
CASE, AND REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL 18 
1. The trial court should have 
granted the continuance so defense 
counsel could have supported 
Mr. Oliver's testimony about his 
previous conviction based on 
misidentification 19 
2. The trial court should have 
granted the continuance so defense 
counsel could have fully explored 
and exposed the weaknesses in the 
eyewitness identifications in this 
case 22 
a. Trial counsel could 
have addressed the prejudice 
arising from the placement 
of the photo from the showup 
in the photo array, . . . . 22 
b. Trial counsel could 
have addressed the 
possibility that more than 
one of the State's witnesses 
were tainted by the improper, 
one photo mug shot showup. 23 
3. The trial court should have 
granted the continuance so defense 
counsel could have supported 
Mr. Oliver's testimony about the 
police misconduct in this case. . 25 
II. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE REDUCED THE 
THEFT COUNT TO A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR 26 
CONCLUSION 28 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. IK (1967) 
Jennings v. State. 744 J».?d i'L! (ok]a. dim, \\.\p. 
1987) . . . . . . . . 
Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 198!) . . . . 
State v. Ballenburaer. 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 1982) 
(per curiam) 
State v. Crestani. 771 P.2d 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326 (Utah App. 1989) . . . 
State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989) . . . . . 
State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) . . . . . . . 
State v. Moosman. 542 P.2d 1093 (Utah 1975) . . . . . 
State v. Morrell. 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) 
State v. Tempi in. 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (lit ah 1.99 0) . 
State v. Thamer. 777 P.2d 432 (Utah 1989) . . . . . . 
State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987) . . . . . . 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (l'*84) . . . . 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) . 
Art. I, § 7, Constitutior 
iii 
Page 
Art. I, § 12, Constitution of Utah 16 
Amend. VI, Constitution of the United States . . . . 16 
Amend. XIV, Constitution of the United States . . . . 16 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GREG N. OLIVER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890625-CA 
Priority No, 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction :i s conferred 01 :i th i s Coi :ii: I: by Utah Code Ann. 
section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (jurisdiction over criminal convictions less 
than first degree felonies). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was Mr. Oliver denied due process of Jaw and/or 
effective assistance of counsel when the trial court denied trial 
counsel's motion for a continuance, despite the fact that trial 
counsel had done no preparation to try th i s case? 
2. Should the theft charge have been reduced to a class A 
misdemeanor because the State failed to present evidence proving the 
value of the property in issue t-o bp at lets:! twin hundred inH fifty 
dollars? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court's denial of the motion to continue the 
trial is reviewed for a clear abuse of the trial court's 
discretion. State v. Moosman, 542 P.2d 1093 (Utah 1975). 
Standards of appellate review of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims are set forth in State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), as follows: 
To determine if the trial court correctly 
applied this [Strickland ineffective assistance] 
standard, a reviewing court 
may engage in its own independent review of 
the district court's conclusion, because the 
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel 
presents a mixed question of law and fact. 
If a state court has rendered specific 
predicate factual findings, those findings 
should be presumed correct unless conditions 
exist which case those findings into doubt. 
The district court's findings of fact, 
however, are reviewable under the clearly 
erroneous standard. 
Id. at 1089 (citation omitted). 
The trial court's findings of fact relating to the value of 
the property are reversed if clearly in error. State v. Johnson, 
771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah App. 1989). The jury's verdict on this 
question is entitled to greater deference. State v. Johnson. 774 
P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The statutes and constitutional provisions to be relied on 
are contained in either Appendix 1 or the body of the brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Oliver was tried and convicted by a jury of burglary 
and theft after a trial on September 5 and 6 of 1989, and sentenced 
to the Utah State Prison for concurrent terms of zero to five and 
one to fifteen years, and ordered to pay restitution (R. 166-167). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
John H. Spielmans, former investigator and author of 
presentence reports for the Utah Department of Corrections, 
testified that on January 7, 1989, he and his son arrived home at 
about 2:30 in the afternoon (T. 18-22). He noticed that the door to 
the garage, which door was normally locked at all times, was open 
(T. 23). Mr. Spielmans went in the garage to investigate and 
noticed something move outside the window in the garage (T. 24). He 
saw a person ten to twelve feet away vaulting a chain link fence and 
continuing northward (T. 24). Mr. Spielmans indicated that the day 
was overcast, and that he was able to view the person vaulting the 
fence "for a very brief period" (T. 24). Mr. Spielmans began 
following the person but lost sight of him (T. 24). 
Upon returning home, Mr. Spielmans saw that the front door 
was mangled, and his son informed him that someone had been inside 
the house (T. 25). 
Mr. Spielmans called 911 on a cordless phone, as he walked 
out on his driveway, where a neighbor approached and pointed out a 
person pressed up against a wooden fence across the street (T. 26). 
Mr. Spielmans thought the person against the fence was the same 
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person he had seen vaulting the fence, noting the person's blond 
hair, navy watch cap, and Levi jacket (T. 27). After some 
hesitation, Mr. Spielmans headed toward the person, who moved 
southward (T. 28). The person was in Mr. Spielmans' clear view as 
the person moved toward his car and Mr. Spielmans chased him, and 
when Mr. Spielmans reached the rear bumper on the driver's side of 
the car, the person said to him, "It wasn't me, man." (T. 35-36). 
The person then got in his car and drove away (T. 36). When the 
person was speaking to Mr. Spielmans, Mr. Spielmans could see the 
left profile of the person's face (T. 37). Mr. Spielmans called 911 
again, giving the license plate, description, and direction of 
travel of the vehicle he had just seen (T. 43). 
When the officer from the Sheriff's office came to 
Mr. Spielmans' home, Mr. Spielmans determined that a watch, a ring, 
four one dollar bills, and four or five coins worth about seventy 
five cents each were missing (T. 43, 71). At that time, 
Mr. Spielmans estimated the value of the watch to be $125 and could 
not remember what value he had placed on the ring, indicating that 
the police report would contain the correct estimate on the value of 
the ring (T. 48-49). After an attempt to refresh his recollection 
by viewing the police report, Mr. Spielmans could not recall the 
value he placed on the ring, indicating that the police report was 
accurate, but that he personally could not recall (T. 50). 
Mr. Spielmans later discovered four or five Canadian dollars worth 
about seventy-five cents a piece were missing (T. 71). 
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When Mr. Spielmans checked the back of his home, he noted 
that one of the sliding door locks was out of place and that there 
were footprints in the snow heading northward (T. 51, 63). 
The next day, a deputy sheriff came to Mr. Spielmans7 door 
and showed him one photograph, and asked if the subject of the 
photograph was the person who had burglarized Mr. Spielmans' home 
(T. 52). Mr. Spielmans indicated that "it appeared to be." 
(T. 52). 
A week later, Mr. Spielmans was in the sheriff's office, 
when they showed him a photo spread of six photos (T. 54). 
Mr. Spielmans selected one of the photos, the center one on the top 
row, indicating that that was the person he had seen vaulting his 
fence (T. 54, 61). 
It appears that the photograph that Mr. Spielmans selected 
from the photo array was the exact same photo he was shown by 
Officer Matthews the week before (T. 228). 
A stipulation was entered into the record, indicating that 
if a Detective Carr were called to the stand, he would testify that 
he showed the same photo spread to Mr. Spielmans on January 10 and 
that Mr. Spielmans selected the photo of Mr. Oliver (T. 127-128). 
In April, Mr. Spielmans attended a lineup of six people, 
selecting a person as the one who had vaulted his fence (T. 57). 
In court, Mr. Spielmans identified Mr. Oliver, "Gentleman 
in the ski sweater, the defendant[']s table," as the person he had 
seen vaulting the fence (T. 58). Mr. Spielmans indicated that 
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Mr. Oliver was also the person he had identified in the photo spread 
and the lineup (T. 58). 
On cross-examination, Mr. Spielmans indicated that his 
description for the police indicated that the person was ,f[m]ale, 
white, wearing a blue navy watch cap, very blond hair protruding 
from under it." (T. 61). He did not give a height or weight, and 
noted that the person had a Levi jacket and gold wire-rim 
clear-lensed glasses (T. 61-62). Mr. Spielmans could not recall if 
the person had any facial hair (T. 62). He did not recall if the 
person had glasses on when he was entering his car (T. 64). 
Mr. Spielmans indicated that as a result of having worked for 
corrections, he was familiar with Mr. Oliver's name, but that he was 
not told that Mr. Oliver was the person in the photo and photo 
spread until after he was shown the photo spread (T. 68). 
Mr. Spielmans indicated that he told his colleagues in the 
intensive supervised parole unit about the events at his home, and 
that those people were responsible for Mr. Oliver's arrest (T. 69). 
Lou Carol Roberts, a neighbor of John Spielmans, testified 
that on January 7, 1989, she saw a person running through her yard, 
indicating that his car had broken down (T. 73-74). She indicated 
that she later told the police that the person had blond hair that 
was short over the ears and longer in back, and did not give a 
description of his clothing (T. 75). She went to the home of a 
neighbor, Bob Borite, to discuss what she had seen, noticed the 
person standing by a car, and wrote down the license plate number of 
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the car (T. 76) . She indicated that as she was watching the person, 
something startled him and he ran from the car (T. 76). 
She ran to Mr. Spielmans7, telling him that the person was 
trying to get into his car, and then Mr. Spielmans gave chase as the 
person got into his car (T. 76). She did not hear the person say 
anything as he got in his car (T. 77). She gave the license plate 
number to Mr. Spielmans (T. 82). 
Ms. Roberts was shown a photo spread either the day after 
or a few days after, and selected a photo of the person she thought 
was the person she saw in her back yard (T. 78). She indicated that 
the photo she selected was the center one on the top row (T. 78). 
When Ms. Roberts viewed the photo spread, she indicated that the 
suspect might have been number two but that she was not exactly sure 
(T. 125). Ms. Roberts attended the lineup and could not identify 
anyone (T. 79). When the prosecutor asked her if she could identify 
the person she saw running through her yard, Ms. Roberts said, "No, 
it's been too long ago." (T. 79). 
Ms. Roberts indicated that the officer did not come to her 
home the day after the events and show her one photo (T. 80). 
She indicated that she did not get a good look at the 
person's face and did not know if he had any facial hair (T. 80). 
When she was asked how she identified the person in the photo 
spread, she indicated that only two of the people in the spread had 
the right hair color, and only one had the right haircut (T. 81). 
She did not remember the person wearing glasses (T. 82). 
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Robert Rufener, another neighbor of John Spielmans, 
testified that on January 7, at about 2:30, he heard his dog bark, 
and looked out the window to see a person going through some yards, 
getting in his car, and driving away (T. 83-85). The person was 
taller than Mr. Rufener, blond, with dark clothing and a mustache 
(T. 89). Mr. Rufener also identified the same photo from the photo 
spread as was identified by Ms. Roberts and Mr. Spielmans (T. 90). 
Mr. Rufener attended the lineup that was held in April, identifying 
a person but indicating that he was uncertain that the person was 
the one he had seen in January (T. 92). He identified Mr. Oliver in 
court as the person he had seen on January 7 (T. 92-93). 
Mr. Rufener was not asked whether he had been shown the single 
photograph. 
Mr. Rufener indicated that the person he saw was not 
wearing glasses (T. 93). 
Another neighbor of Mr. Spielmans, John R. Call, testified 
that on January 7, he was driving in his car and nearly hit a 
pedestrian running from the Rufener property (T. 96). This person 
was being chased by Mr. Spielmans (T. 97). The person was young 
(late twenties to early thirties), athletic, with long, blond hair 
(T. 98). The car was a grey two-door with a hatch back, and may or 
may not have been spotted, as if in preparation for repainting 
(T. 98-99). When Mr. Call was shown the photo spread, he was 
uncertain and could only identify two possible suspects (T. 99). 
When Mr. Call attended the lineup in April, he did not identify 
anyone and did not identify Mr. Oliver at trial (T. 99-100). 
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Mr. Call was not asked if he was shown the single 
photograph of Mr. Oliver. 
Salt Lake Sheriff's Deputy, Kevin Matthews, testified that 
in investigating this case on January 7, he spoke with 
Mr. Spielmans, his son, and Mr. Rufener (T. 103-104). He indicated 
that Mr. Spielmans' description of the person was "Male, white, 
between the age of 25 to 30 years old, about five foot ten, 180 
pounds, blond, curly hair, with wire rim glasses. Suspect was 
wearing black gloves, and ... a blue watchman type cap." (T. 105). 
He said that Mr. Rufener gave the same description (T. 105). 
Officer Matthews indicated that all of the witnesses gave 
the same description of the car, that Mr. Spielmans indicated that 
it was a white over red older Monte Carlo (T. 105). Mr. Spielmans 
also gave the officer the license plate number of the car (T. 105). 
Officer Matthews indicated that he interviewed Mr. Call, but was not 
aware at that time that Mr. Call was a witness to the events in this 
case (T. 106). 
Officer Matthews traced the footprints in the back yard to 
the Roberts' or Rufeners' yard (T. 107). Officer Matthews then 
checked the license plate number and drove to the residence of the 
registered owner (T. 108). As he approached the address of the 
vehicle, he did not see the vehicle, but parked his car down the 
street and approached a house next to the house of the registered 
owner to investigate (T. 108). 
As Officer Matthews spoke with the neighbors, he saw a 
person matching the suspect's description exiting the home of the 
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registered owner of the suspect car (T. 109). Officer Matthews saw 
the person look at Officer Matthews and hurry to a car and leave 
(T. Ill). The person and his friend who was with him both looked 
shocked and left in separate vehicles (T. 112). Officer Matthews 
identified Mr. Oliver as the suspect (T. 114). 
Officer Matthews pursued the suspect, who was driving in a 
green Oldsmobile Cutlass (T. 112), but lost him in a subdivision 
(T. 116). The other person was driving a Ford Pinto (T. 112). 
Officer Matthews had an idea that the suspect was Greg 
Oliver, and so he obtained a photograph of Mr. Oliver through the 
records division of Corrections and took it to Mr. Spielmans for 
identification (T. 116). When asked if he showed the single photo 
to any of the other witnesses, he could not recall (T. 116). He 
indicated that when he showed Mr. Oliver's photograph to 
Mr. Spielmans, he told Mr. Spielmans that he had "reason to believe 
this may be the person that entered his residence earlier that day." 
(T. 117). When Officer Matthews asked Mr. Spielmans if he could 
identify the person in the photo, Mr. Spielmans indicated, "That's 
the guy." (T. 117). 
Officer Matthews indicated that Mr. Spielmans was the only 
witness he showed the single photo (as opposed to the spread), but 
his police report indicated, "I contacted the witnesses at their 
residences, ...and they were able to pick Mr. Oliver out a[s] the 
suspect in the burglary from a picture." (T. 122-123). Officer 
Matthews tried to explain the discrepancy by noting that he may have 
shown the photo to Mr. Spielmans' son, who did not see anything 
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(T. 122). When asked repeatedly about the discrepancy between the 
report and his testimony, Officer Matthews would not commit himself, 
answering with phrases like "I don't believe" and "all I remember" 
(T. 123). 
He indicated that he had been trained that photo spreads 
are more desirable than photo showups, but indicated that he felt 
that because Mr. Spielmans worked for Adult Probation and Parole, 
and because Mr. Spielmans had indicated when reporting the burglary 
that he probably knew the suspect from his work with Probation and 
Parole, an exception would be appropriate (T. 124). 
Vernon Beesley of the Sheriff's Office went to the 
Spielmans' residence on January 7 and was unable to obtain any 
useful fingerprints (T. 129-132). 
Mr. Oliver testified that he had previously been convicted 
of aggravated robbery, and that a year after the conviction, he was 
acquitted when the actual robbers were caught (T. 149). He 
indicated that he later altered a prescription and was returned to 
the prison, with a sentence that expired in November of 1988 
(T. 150). On January 7, Mr. Oliver weighed 159 pounds, his hair was 
short, he had no mustache, and did not wear glasses (T. 150). He 
indicated that previous to about July of 1989, he had never worn 
prescription glasses (T. 151). 
He testified that on January 7, 1989, he attended a baby 
shower, arriving at noon or 2:00, and then drove in his Oldsmobile 
to the store (T. 151). He indicated that a person named Quentin 
borrowed Karen Weed's Monte Carlo, and told Mr. Oliver at about 
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4:00 p.m. that he had run from the police in it that day because the 
registration was not in order (T. 151-154). 
Mr. Oliver described Quentin as almost six feet tall, with 
long blond hair that is sometimes pulled up in a cap (T. 156). 
Quentin did not tell Mr. Oliver about the robbery (T. 156). 
Mr. Oliver indicated that as he left Karen Weed's house, he 
saw a police car, but thought nothing of it, and did not make any 
effort to evade the police (T. 155). The police car did not turn 
its red light on (T. 156). 
Three weeks later, Quentin went to Las Vegas (T. 163). 
About a month after the baby shower, three parole officers arrested 
Mr. Oliver (T. 157), but Mr. Oliver had no opportunity to tell the 
police his side of the story (T. 163). Mr. Oliver did not 
burglarize Mr. Spielmans' home (T. 157). 
Karen Weed testified in rebuttal for the State. She 
indicated that on January 7, 1990, her Monte Carlo was brown with 
grey primer spots and rust (T. 178). Mr. Oliver drove her to the 
baby shower in that car on January 7 (T. 179). She indicated that 
Quentin did not have permission to drive the Monte Carlo on the 7th 
(T. 179). 
After Mr. Oliver was arrested, he asked Karen to testify 
for him that he was at the shower the whole time, but she did not 
know if he was or was not there the whole time (T. 181). She 
testified that Mr. Oliver had worn prescription glasses during the 
five years that she had known him, and that on January 7, she 
thought he owned a pair of gold rimmed glasses (T. 181). 
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She described Quentin. as tail, skinny, with orange-red 
shoulder length frizzy hair and lots of facial blemishes, and 
indicated that he drove a 1976 Oldsmobile Cutlass (T. 182). She 
indicated that she and Quentin traded cars frequently and that her 
registration was expired on January 7 (T. 182-183). 
When defense counsel asked Ms. Weed about a previous 
interview with the prosecutor and her previous recollection of the 
car Mr. Oliver was driving on January 7 when he picked her up from 
the baby shower, Ms. Weed indicated that she could not recall the 
car because she was on drugs (T. 183-184). Her children said that 
he was driving her Monte Carlo (T. 184). She indicated that they 
were in the Monte Carlo, but she had previously told the prosecutor 
that they were driving Mr. Oliver's Oldsmobile (T. 185). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's denial of trial counsel's motion for a 
continuance forced Mr. Oliver to be represented by counsel who had 
done no preparation for the trial, in violation of Mr. Oliver's 
rights to due process of law and effective assistance of counsel. 
Mr. Oliver must be retried. 
The State failed to present evidence that the value of the 
property taken from the Spielmans' residence was at least two 
hundred and fifty dollars. When the case is retried, the theft 




MR. OLIVER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
AND/OR EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
WHEN THE TRIAL COURT FORCED THE TRIAL TO PROCEED, 
DESPITE THE FACT THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL HAD 
DONE NO PREPARATION. 
On the first day of trial, Mr. 01iver/s trial counsel moved 
for a continuance, explaining that trial counsel had expected to 
dispose of the case through a plea and had not done any preparation 
for trial of the case, "Based on that, I didn't do any formal trial 
preparation that I normally do for a trial such as this, and 
consequently, I am not prepared to proceed to trial." (T. 4). The 
trial court apologetically denied the motion for a continuance, 
indicating that although plea negotiations were continuing, the 
trial court had informed the parties on the Friday before the 
Tuesday trial that they should perform as if they were going to 
trial (T. 8-9). 
Defense counsel argued that it was unfair for defense 
counsel to rely on the time frame for plea negotiations offered by 
the State and to be forced to go to trial without time for 
preparation (T. 7). The prosecutor, Ms. Byrne, indicated at the 
close of the State's case that she had contacted one of its 
witnesses on Friday and told her she did not need to come because 
Ms. Byrne anticipated the plea to be entered on Tuesday (T. 145). 
Shortly after the State's case had been presented, the 
trial court made a record concerning the court's denial of the 
motion for a continuance, explicitly finding that any error in the 
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denial was harmless and not prejudicial to Mr. Oliver. The record 
indicates as follows: 
One thing. I think it's almost obvious, but 
sometimes obviousness gets lost in the record, 
particularly when the trial records that is not 
the one that handled things on appeal from the 
plaintiff's perspective. Each of the witnesses 
who testified yesterday, it seemed to me, that 
there was full availability of cross-examination 
by Mr. McCaughey and he took advantage of that. 
One of the reasons why I wanted to make sure 
whether or not Mr. McCaughey wanted the witnesses 
back was in the event there was any appeal on 
this question of a continuance, I want to make 
sure the record is very clear that full 
opportunity had been made available to the 
defendant, to the witnesses, and all of which 
indicates to me that where I think I'm absolutely 
correct on denying the motion to a continuance, 
even if for some reason I'm wrong, is it's very 
clear that any error has been harmless in the 
sense that full access has been had to witnesses, 
and in fact, since the trial did not conclude in 
the first day, that there has been extra time to 
prepare, extra time to do whatever is necessary, 
so that there's no conditions of denial on the 
motion for continuance, except for moving the 
case along, which is a bearable factor. 
Furthermore, it appears to me that there may 
have been some benefit in the sense that this 
witness you mentioned, Mrs. Lehman [State's 
witness], is not available. 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: I appreciate that with the 
witnesses and making sure that we can have them 
come back. 
THE COURT: Do you want any witnesses back? 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: I do not, your Honor 
.... 
Sometimes you have to take advantage of the 
record to express your feelings at the time, and 
that's — 
.... 
That's sort of what I was doing. 
THE COURT: I'm not saying anything was 
untoward. The record is there for a purpose. 
You use it for the correct purpose. I believe I 
use it for the correct purpose today. 
(T. 146-147). 
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A. PREPARATION OF THE ACCUSED'S DEFENSE IS ESSENTIAL TO RIGHTS TO 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Procedural due process recognizes that a party must have 
the opportunity to prepare a defense. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 
1207 (Utah 1983).i 
Several cases on the topic of effective assistance of 
counsel2 recognize that trial counsel are expected to prepare to 
defend a criminal defendant. 
The need for preparation of the defense case was recognized 
in State v. Tempiin, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1990). The court 
there began its analysis by quoting the basic Strickland test: 
"First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing 
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed 
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, 
the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, a trial whose result is reliable." 
Id, at 15, quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(L984). 
The Tempiin court found that the first prong of the 
Strickland test had been met because defense counsel had failed to 
1. Due process of law is guaranteed by Article I section 7 
of the Utah Constitution, and by the fourteenth amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
2. The rights to effective assistance of counsel and to 
present a defense are provided in Article I section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution and the sixth amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
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procure defense witnesses to support Mr* Tempiin's testimony. The 
court stated, 
If counsel does not adequately investigate 
the underlying facts of a case, including the 
availability of prospective defense witnesses, 
counsel's performance cannot fall within the 
"wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance." This is because a decision not to 
investigate cannot be considered a tactical 
decision. It is only after an adequate inquiry 
has been made that counsel can make a reasonable 
decision to call or not to call particular 
witnesses for tactical reasons. 
Tempiinf 1 4 9 u t a h A d v # R e p # a t 16 (footnote, citation omitted). 
The Tempiin court found that the second prong of the 
Strickland test had been met in that case because the trial attorney 
had failed to obtain defense witnesses that would have impacted on 
the credibility of the two opposing witnesses in the case, and the 
testimony of those witnesses would have impacted the n/entire 
evidentiary picture.'" Tempiin at 17, quoting Strickland at 696. 
In Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court 
explained, 
[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision 
that makes particular investigations 
unnecessary. In other words, counsel has a duty 
to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular 
investigations unnecessary. 
Id. at 691. 
In State v. Crestani. 771 P.2d 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
this Court found that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
obtain pertinent bank records involved in the case, and in failing 
to prepare defense witnesses for their testimony in court. 
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After discussing the Strickland standards, this Court 
quoted Jennings v, State, 744 P.2d 212 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), for 
further explanation of trial counsel's duty to prepare: 
"When counsel knows of the existence of a person 
or persons who possess information relevant to 
his client's defense and he fails to use due 
diligence to investigate that evidence, such a 
lack of industry cannot be justified as 
'strategic error.' The American Bar Association 
Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense Function 
4-4.1, maintain that: "it is the duty of the 
lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the 
circumstances of the case and to explore all 
avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits 
of the case and the penalty in the event of 
conviction." 
Id. at 1091, quoting Jennings at 214. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE FORCED 
MR. OLIVER TO GO TO TRIAL WITHOUT PREPARATION OF HIS CASE, AND 
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
When trial counsel was forced to go to trial without any 
preparation (T. 4), Mr. Oliver was forced to go to trial in 
violation of his right to prepare his defense, see Nelson v. 
Jacobson, supra, and with representation falling below objective 
standards of reasonable performance. See Tempiin, Crestani, and 
Strickland, supra. 
Whether this Court views the violation in this case as a 
due process violation, requiring error to be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt,3 or as an effective assistance of counsel 
3. See Chapman v. California. 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)(if 
constitutional errors are not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
reversal is required). 
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violation, requiring error to undermine confidence in the verdict,4 
Mr, Oliver is entitled to a new trial. 
The trial court did not address the continuance issue in 
terms of due process or effective assistance of counsel. The trial 
court did, however, conclude that Mr. Oliver was not prejudiced by 
the trial court's failure to grant the motion for continuance, 
because defense counsel had full access to the witnesses who 
testified, because the trial ran overnight (allowing extra 
preparation time), and because one of the State's witnesses was 
unavailable to testify (T. 146-147). The factual predicates of the 
trial court's ruling are reviewable for clear error, and the legal 
conclusions to be drawn from the facts in this case are open for 
this Court's independent evaluation. State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 
1085, 1089 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(citation omitted). 
Several aspects of Mr. Oliver's case demonstrate that he 
was prejudiced by the denial of the motion for continuance. 
1- The trial court should have granted the continuance so defense 
counsel could have supported Mr. Oliver's testimony about his 
previous conviction based on misidentification. 
As noted in the statement of facts, the prosecution of 
Mr. Oliver was based primarily on the eyewitness identification by 
four witnesses who saw a person in the vicinity of the burglary and 
theft. The essence of Mr. Oliver's defense was that the State's 
4. See Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 694 
(1984)(denial of effective assistance of counsel requires reversal 
if confidence in verdict is undermined). 
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error. The inclusion of proper support for Mr. Oliver's defense 
concerning eyewitness misidentification could have "affected the 
entire evidentiary picture," calling the verdict in this case into 
question, Tempiin, supra. and cannot be considered harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Chapman, supra. 
2. The trial court should have granted the continuance so defense 
counsel could have fully explored and exposed the weaknesses in the 
eyewitness identifications in this case. 
a. Trial counsel could have addressed the prejudice arising from the 
placement of the photo from the showup in the photo array. 
At least one of the four eyewitnesses was shown a one 
photo, mug shot showup the day after the crime, and was subsequently 
shown a photo array and lineup, and identified Mr. Oliver as the 
perpetrator of the crime in this case (T. 52, 54, 58, 61, 116-117, 
127-128; R. 3, M.H. 233-234). 
The same mug shot used in that show up was placed in the 
photo array that was shown to all of the State's witnesses 
(M.H. 228-230, in Appendix 3). 
At the pretrial motion to suppress eyewitness 
identification, Mr. Oliver was represented by Lynn R. Brown of the 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (M.H. 219). However, at trial, 
Mr. Oliver was represented by new, private counsel. The prosecutor 
and trial court apparently forgot that the mug shot (State's 
Exhibit 1 from the motion to suppress) was part of the photo array, 
and thought that the one photo from the showup had been lost 
(T. 52-53, 59-60, in Appendix 4). 
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Had the trial court granted adequate preparation time, 
trial counsel could have reviewed the motion to suppress and 
addressed the prejudice arising from this repeated suggestion of 
Mr. Oliver1s mug shot in the showup and then in the photo array. 
b. Trial counsel could have addressed the possibility that more than 
one of the State's witnesses were tainted by the improper, one photo 
mug shot showup. 
Salt Lake Sheriff's Deputy, Kevin Matthews, testified that 
in investigating this case on January 7, he had an idea that the 
suspect was Mr. Oliver, and so he obtained a photograph of 
Mr. Oliver through the records division of the Department of 
Corrections and took it to Mr. Spielmans for identification 
(T. 116). He indicated that when he showed Mr. Oliver's photograph 
to Mr. Spielmans, he told Mr. Spielmans that he had "reason to 
believe this may be the person that entered his residence earlier 
that day." (T. 117). When Officer Matthews asked Mr. Spielmans if 
Mr. Spielmans could identify the person in the photo, Mr. Spielmans 
pointed at the photo and said, "That's the guy." (T. 117).6 
When asked if he showed the single photo to any of the 
other witnesses, he did not recall having done so (T. 116). His 
police report indicated, "I contacted the witnesses at their 
residences, ...and they were able to pick Mr. Oliver out a[s] the 
6. Compare Officer Matthews' testimony at the motion to 
suppress, "And Mr. Spielmans observed the picture and stated that he 
felt positive that that was the suspect." (M.H. 267, 271-272). 
Compare Mr. Spielmans' testimony that he indicated that the photo 
appeared to be the person (T. 52). 
- 23 
Further, Officer Matthews' encounter with Mr. Oliver and 
the subsequent investigation and prosecution may have been tainted 
by the fact that when Officer Matthews was at the neighbors' house, 
they informed him that their neighbor, Mr. Oliver, had recently been 
released from prison (M.H. 261). 
Had the trial court granted adequate preparation time, 
trial counsel could have sought the evidence necessary to 
corroborate Mr. Oliver's testimony concerning the police misconduct 
in this case, which may have borne directly on Officer Matthews' 
credibility, and the identification procedures used in this case. 
Particularly when combined with the other omissions of 
preparation in this case, trial counsel's failure to procure and 
present evidence to support Mr. Oliver's testimony and to contradict 
Officer Matthews' testimony calls for a new trial under the 
Strickland and Chapman standards. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE 
REDUCED THE THEFT COUNT TO A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-412 classifies theft according 
to the value of property taken. It provides, in part, as follows: 
(1) Theft of property and services as 
provided in this chapter shall be punishable: 
.... 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services 
is more than $250 but not more than $1,000; 
.... 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of 
the property stolen was more than $100 but 
does not exceed $250. 
.... 
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When the officer from the Sheriff's office came to 
Mr. Spielmans7 home, Mr. Spielmans determined that a watch, a ring, 
four one dollar bills, and four or five coins worth about seventy 
five cents each were missing (T. 43, 71). Mr. Spielmans estimated 
the value of the watch to be $125, and could not remember what value 
he had placed on the ring, indicating that the police report would 
contain the correct estimate on the value of the ring (T. 48-49). 
After an attempt to refresh his recollection by having him read the 
police report, Mr. Spielmans could not recall the value he placed on 
the ring, indicating that the police report was accurate but that he 
personally could not recall (T. 50). Mr. Spielmans later discovered 
four or five Canadian dollars worth about seventy-five cents a piece 
were missing (T. 71). Mr. Spielmans never indicated personal 
knowledge of the value of the ring, and the police report was not 
admitted into evidence. See State v. Morrell, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 
26, 29 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(police reports are not admissible under 
business and public records exceptions to the hearsay rule in most 
circumstances). The ring was not presented in evidence. 
Thus, it appears that the approximate value of the property 
properly established by the State was $140. 
When defense counsel moved for a reduction of the theft 
charge to a class A misdemeanor, the court denied the motion, 
finding that Mr. Spielmans had testified that the police report had 
refreshed his recollection. The trial court's finding is subject to 
the "clearly erroneous" standard of appellate review, adopted from 
interpretations of federal rules of civil procedure and discussed in 
- 27 -
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). The standard was 
explained in Walker as follows: "[I]f the findings (or the trial 
court's verdict in a criminal case) are against the clear weight of 
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings (or 
verdict) will be set aside." Id. at 193. This court's review of 
Mr. Spielmans' testimony will reveal that the trial court's finding 
was clearly erroneous. See Appendix 3, containing trial court's 
finding and pertinent pages of Mr. Spielmans' testimony. 
Even if this Court views the issue as the review of the 
jury's verdict and applies the deferential standard of review 
applicable thereto, State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), 
the evidence is insufficient. Cf. State v. Ballenburger, 652 P.2d 
927 (Utah 1982)(per curiam)(discussing modes of proof of value of 
stolen property). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should remand this case to the trial court for a 
new trial, instructing on the importance of adequate preparation of 
Mr. Oliver's defense. Because the State presented evidence 
supporting the misdemeanor theft conviction, rather than the felony 
conviction, Mr. Oliver must be retried on the misdemeanor theft 
charge. 
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Respectfully submitted this ZLL-hL day of February, 
1991. 
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TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, § 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife 
shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall 
any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
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A. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL CONTEXT 
Mr. Oliver was tried and convicted by a jury of Burglary 
and Theft on September 5 and 6 of 1989, sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison for concurrent terms of zero to five and one to fifteen 
years, and ordered to pay restitution (R. 166-167).* 
On the first day of trial, Mr. Oliver1s trial counsel moved 
for a continuance, explaining that trial counsel had expected to 
dispose of the case through a plea and had not done any preparation 
for trial of the case, "Based on that, I didn't do any formal trial 
preparation that I normally do for a trial such as this, and 
1. The district court pleadings file will be referred to 
as f,R.". The transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress 
will be referred to as MM.H.". The transcript of the trial 
(contained in two volumes, numbered consecutively) will be referred 
to as "T.". 
consequently, I am not prepared to proceed to trial." (T. 4). The 
trial court apologetically denied the motion for a continuance 
(T. 9). 
Shortly after the State's case had been presented, the 
trial court made a record concerning the court's denial of the 
motion for a continuance, explicitly finding that any error in the 
denial was harmless and not prejudicial to Mr. Oliver (T. 146-147). 
Mr. Oliver seeks a remand to the trial court to establish 
that the denial of the motion for continuance resulted in the denial 
of his rights to due process of law and effective assistance of 
counsel. 
This case involves a burglary and theft that occurred on 
January 7, 1989 (R. 6-7). The prosecution of Mr. Oliver was 
primarily based on the eyewitness identification of four witnesses 
who saw a person in the vicinity of the burglary and theft. 
The essence of Mr. Oliver's defense was that the State's 
eyewitnesses had misidentified him as the person in the vicinity of 
•the burglary and theft—he testified that he had previously been 
convicted of aggravated robbery on the basis of eyewitness 
identification and that he was later acquitted of that conviction 
when his innocence was established (T. 149) . His testimony on this 
point was as follows: 
Okay. Mr. Oliver, have you ever been convicted 
of a felony? 
Yes, I was. 
When was that? 
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First, it was back in '83. I was convicted of 
aggravated robbery, and the jury trial was 
convicted because I have this blond hair. A year 
later they caught the guys that did it, and I was 
acquitted. 
Okay. 
They took me from prison and brought me back here 
to jail, and I—in '82 I had mv right hand 
severed off and I filled a prescription and— 
Forged a prescription? 
I altered it, I filled it. Somebody else forged 
it. I filled it and the doctor give me Motrin. 
Were vou convicted for that? 
Yes. The put that—charged me in that and 
convicted me of that and sentenced me back to 
prison. 
Then vou were on parole? 
Yes. Thev let me out on parole after that. And 
I expirated in November of '88. 
(T. 149-150)(emphasis added).2 
As is discernable from examination of the emphasized 
portion of Mr. Oliver's testimony, supra, there were problems with 
Mr. Oliver's credibility. In addition to his admission that he had 
been involved in and convicted of forgery, the jurors were also 
faced with Officer Matthews' testimony that Officer Matthews had a 
hunch that the offender in this case was Mr. Oliver (T. 116). 
Officer Matthews also indicated that when Mr. Spielmans reported the 
crime, Mr. Spielmans seemed to think that he knew the suspect from 
his work with Adult Probation and Parole (T. 124). 
2. In closing argument, trial counsel argued, in part, as 
follows: 
Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Oliver, as he testified 
was sent to prison once on mistaken identity. 
And was released when they caught the right 
person. I would ask you not let that happen 
again, to review this evidence and bring back a 
verdict of not guilty on both charges. 
(T. 201). 
- 3 -
Trial counsel should have procured evidence to support 
Mr. Oliver1s testimony. A review of the district court pleadings 
file in the 1982 case referred to by Mr. Oliver establishes that 
Mr. Oliver was in fact convicted and that the conviction was later 
set aside when the actual perpetrators confessed. Trial counsel for 
Mr. Oliver in the 1982 case indicates that the basis of that 
conviction was misidentification of Mr. Oliver. See Appendix 1, 
containing the affidavit of counsel; Appendix 2, containing 
certified documents from the district court pleadings file in the 
1982 misidentification, aggravated robbery case; State v. Tempiin, 
149 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1990)(ineffective assistance of counsel 
established when trial counsel failed to call witness to corroborate 
defendant's testimony). 
The trial court should have granted the motion for the 
continuance so that trial counsel could prepare to represent 
Mr. Oliver. 
Salt Lake Sheriff's Deputy, Kevin Matthews, testified that 
in investigating this case on January 7, he had an idea that the 
suspect was Mr. Oliver, and so he obtained a photograph of 
Mr. Oliver through the records division of the Department of 
Corrections and took it to Mr. Spielmans for identification 
(T. 116) . He indicated that when he showed Mr. Oliver's photograph 
to Mr. Spielmans, he told Mr. Spielmans that he had "reason to 
believe this may be the person that entered his residence earlier 
that day11 (T. 117). When Officer Matthews asked Mr. Spielmans if 
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Mr. Spielmans could identify the person in the photo, Mr. Spielmans 
pointed at the photo and said, "That's the guy." (T. 117).3 
When asked if he showed the single photo to any of the 
other witnesses, he did not recall having done so (T. 116). His 
police report indicated, "I contacted the witnesses at their 
residences, . . . and they were able to pick Mr. Oliver out a[s] the 
suspect in the burglary from a picture." (T. 122-123)(emphasis 
added). Officer Matthews tried to explain the report by noting that 
he may have shown the photo to Mr. Spielmans' son, who did not see a 
suspect at the scene of the crime (T. 122). When asked repeatedly 
about the discrepancy between the report and his testimony, Officer 
Matthews would not commit himself, answering with phrases like "I 
don't believe" and "all I remember" (T. 123) . 
As is demonstrated by review of the record in this case, 
trial counsel did not ask two of the four eyewitnesses if Officer 
Matthews had shown them the one photo, mug shot show up of 
Mr. Oliver prior to their exposure to the photo array, the line-up, 
or Mr. Oliver's in-court appearance (T. 83-95; 95-102). 
Trial counsel should have addressed the possibility that 
three of the four eyewitnesses were improperly tainted by the one 
3. Compare Officer Matthews' testimony at the motion to 
suppress, "And Mr. Spielmans observed the picture and stated that he 
felt positive that that was the suspect." (M.H. 267, 271-272). 
Compare Mr. Spielmans' testimony that he indicated that the photo 
appeared to be the person (T. 52). 
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photo, mug shot show up.4 
The trial court should have granted the motion for the 
continuance so that trial counsel could prepare to represent 
Mr. Oliver. 
As was discussed above, at least one of the eyewitnesses 
was shown a one photo, mug shot show up the day after the crime, and 
was subsequently shown a photo array and line-up, and identified 
Mr. Oliver as the perpetrator of the crime in this case (T. 52, 54, 
58, 61, 116-117, 127-128; R. 3, M.H. 233-234). 
The same mug shot used in that show up was placed in the 
photo array that was shown to all of the State's witnesses 
(M.H. 228-230, in Appendix 3) . 
At the pretrial motion to suppress eyewitness 
identification, Mr. Oliver was represented by Lynn R. Brown of the 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (M.H. 219). However, at trial, 
Mr. Oliver was represented by new, private counsel. The prosecutor 
and trial court apparently forgot that the mug shot (State7s 
Exhibit 1 from the motion to suppress) was part of the photo array, 
and thought that the one photo from the show up had been lost 
(T. 52-53, 59-60, in Appendix 4). 
4. The eyewitness who indicated that she was not shown the 
one photo, mug shot show up identified Mr. Oliver in the photo array 
and did not identify anyone at the line up or at trial (T. 78-80) . 
questioned by the police or given an opportunity to tell his side of 
the story (T. 151, 163). 
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Trial counsel should have reviewed the motion to suppress 
and addressed the prejudice arising from this repeated suggestion of 
Mr. Oliver's mug shot in the show up and then in the photo array. 
The trial court should have granted the motion for the 
continuance so that trial counsel could prepare to represent 
Mr. Oliver. 
The essence of Mr. Oliver's view of the case was that he 
was innocent and that his conviction was based on police misbehavior 
and failure to investigate honestly. He indicated that he was never 
questioned by the police or given an opportunity to tell his side of 
the story (T. 151, 163). 
Although Mr. Oliver indicated that his parole had expired 
in November of 1988 (T. 150), he was arrested by three parole 
officers (T. 156-157). 
He disputed Officer Matthews' testimony that Mr. Oliver had 
evaded Officer Matthews during the investigation of the crime 
(T.108-112), indicating that Mr. Oliver did not hear a siren, and 
asking that Officer Matthews be recalled and asked if Officer 
Matthews had turned his red light on (T. 155-156, 165). While 
Officer Matthews testified that he saw Mr. Oliver exiting Karen 
Weed's home during the alleged evasion, Mr. Oliver indicated that a 
photograph of the scene would have shown that from where Officer 
Matthews was standing, his view of Karen Weed's home was blocked by 
a fence (T.160-161). 
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Trial counsel should have sought the evidence necessary to 
corroborate Mr. Oliver's testimony concerning the police misconduct 
in this case, which may have borne directly on Officer Matthews' 
credibility and the identification procedures used in this case. 
See Tempiin, supra. 
The trial court should have granted the motion for the 
continuance so that trial counsel could prepare to represent 
Mr. Oliver. 
B. LEGAL BASIS FOR ALLEGATIONS OF DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution guarantees all 
people the right to due process of law: "No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." 
Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides more specific 
protections to those accused of crime: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in 
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband 
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
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The sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States 
Constitution provide the accused with rights to due process and 
assistance of counsel.5 
These constitutional provisions and the counterparts have 
been interpreted and applied in contexts similar to the instant one, 
and support Mr. Oliver's assertions that the trial court's denial of 
the motion for continuance, trial counsel's lack of preparation in 
this case, and improper identification procedures and other police 
misconduct denied him due process of law and effective assistance of 
counsel and void his convictions. E.g., Nelson v. Johnson. 669 P.2d 
1207 (Utah 1983)(component of due process is provision of adequate 
time for preparation of defense); State v. Tempi in. 149 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 14 (Utah 1990)(effective assistance of counsel requires 
5. The sixth amendment provides, 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses 
in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides, 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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investigation and preparation of defense); State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 
432 (Utah 1989)(due process requires reliable eyewitness 
identification).6 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Oliver seeks a remand to the trial court to determine 
whether trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient and 
prejudicial, Strickland v. Washington; 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and 
to determine whether the trial court's failure to grant the 
continuance and the improper identification procedures require a new 
trial in this case. 
In the alternative, Mr. Oliver requests that the due date 
for his opening brief be extended until fifteen days after 
disposition of the motion to remand. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of January, 1991. 
C^BROOK 
ijr) Mr. Oliver 
6. Mr. Oliver is aware that in order to rely on the Utah 
Constitution, he must present adequate briefing on the matter in the 
trial court, State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986), and intends to 
do so in the event that this Court grants the remand. 
- 10 -
DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 




(to motion for evidentiary hearing) 
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, #5292 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : AFFIDAVIT 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
GREG N. OLIVER, : 
Case No. 890625-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, ELIZABETH HOLBROOK,_ declare under: penalty, of perjury 
that the following is true and correct: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State 
of Utah and employed as an appellate attorney at the Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association. 
2. I am the attorney appointed to represent GREG N. OLIVER 
in the above-captioned case during the pendency of his appeal. 
3. I was not present during the trial of this matter and 
did not represent Mr. Oliver at trial. 
4. I have spoken with Robert N. Macri, the attorney who 
represented Mr. Oliver in the aggravated robbery/misidentification 
case documented in Appendix 2 to this brief. 
5. It is my understanding from talking to Mr. Macri that: 
(a) in that aggravated robbery case, Mr. Oliver was 
convicted on the basis of eyewitness identification 
testimony of two witnesses; 
(b) Mr. Oliver was later acquitted of that charge when 
the real perpetrator of the crime was found. 
(c) Visual comparison of Mr. Oliver and the 
perpetrator of the aggravated robbery demonstrates 
effectively Mr. Oliver's argument that eyewitness 
identification/is unreliable. 
DATED this / 1) day of January. 1991. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this JL22 day of 
January, 1991.
 — 
W ® 7 iSaolUtah , 
jV^U Y^/A 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah 




(to motion for evidentiary hearing) 
In the District Court of Davis County F I L E D 
State of Utah
 JUL1 lg83 
THE STATE OF UTAH 1 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
GREGORY NESS OLIVER 
_, Defendant J 
WCHAaaALLPHIN.Oerk 
Davis County, Utah 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
AND COMMITMENT TO THE 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
Case No. 4213 
That whereas, said defendant-, GREGORY NESS OLIVER 
having heretofore on the 9 t h day of Jiinfi , A D. 19_B3_ 
Having been convicted by a Jury
 m ^ ^ 3 ^ of the 
FIM4 G*Kir m Havteff B M O w l e t * By • Jury T» Of 
the charge of Aggravated Robbery, second degree felony 
- . , a, felony 
NMW 1 OrtMM 
and now being present in court, accompanied by his attorney, and ready for sentence, thereupon the 
court renders its Judgment as follows: 
YOU, Gregory Ngsa O l i v e r , 
having 
Having been convicted by a Jury
 § ^ ^ ^ adjudBCS y^ to 
r%md GuUly «r Havtac l m C—»m»* Uy a Jmty 
be guilty and it is the judgment of the court and the sentence of the law tliat you 
Gregory Neas Oliver 
for your said offense do be confined in the Utah State Prison for the term of 
JESE2 hi,!,,,,*.!. ~ ~ 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the said 
Gregory Ness Oliver 
be sentenced to imprisonment 
In the Utah State Prison for a term of on* to f ifteen yavBt ANP-PAY-RESTITUTIOK-IN , 
THE AMOUNT OF $550.00. 
said sentence to begin as of J u n * 2 8 , 19JLL-
NOW, THEREFORE, you Crgyorv Neag O l i v e r _ _ 
, the 
H U M « PitaMNr 
above named defendant , are remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Davis County, State of 
Utah, to be by him delivered into the custody of the Warden, or other proper officer of said Utah 
State Prison in execution of this Judgment and sentence. 
WITNESS: Honorable —Douglas L Coraaby-
Judge, and the seal of the District Court of the Second Judicial District in and for the State of 
Utah affixed this 28 day of _JH2£ , A D. 1 9 _ § i 
JQPNEY W. WALKED 
Clerk of the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District in and for Davis County, 
^ ^ State of Utaii. 
By ^^^r^^r^^l 
Received -ctfir*: Athi day of June, 1983, from Brant Johnson, Sheriff of Davis 
to 15 Yre County. ,Utah, the^ peraon of Gregory Neaa Oliver for the term of 1 
at the* Utah Sta'te? Prison for Aggr. Robbery. 
..,1. -iH'tiiA a iiAirji^ 
Also 1 Tr for Theft. 
Kenneth V. Shulsen, Warden 
•O 
Beverley 
I.D. 4 Officer 
Circuit Court, State of Utah 
Davis County, Bountiful Department 
Commitment 
GREGORY NESS OLIVER ] 
Defendant / 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH: 
The above-named defendant has been charged with the crime of 
THEFT 
*r BOUNTIFUL. DAVIS COUNTY. UTAH 
A«- JULY 15. 1980 _____ 
( waimsanBMm^^ 
( X) The defendant was found guilty and was sentenced to pay a fine of 
< 00 and to be imprisoned in the county jail for______5 days anc 
Q days of the imprisonment was suspended upon payment of the fine 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to take the defendant into your custody and safety keep the defendant: 
( x) until he shall serve out the imprisonment of ____2£5 days. 
Special instructions: THTS TTME MAY BF SFRVFD mNrTTBEFNTT.Y WTTH ANY 
JATT. SFNTFMPF nTSTPTrT pnTTRT MTCWT T F W AM MP fit TffW DM TTTMF ? g IQfl^ 
TF
 T W F SFNTFMPF TM TUSTTjTCT TOTTBT TS T . " g TWAM 1 VPAP< Ml? M TXTVV MTTCT 
mMPT.FTF TWF VFAP r>M TWF SFMTFMPF OM TWTC r v i t r g 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT MACRI, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
354 East 600 South 
S a l t Lake City 84111 
Tel 364-3018 .. %s .-»<•»< 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
GREGORY NESS OLIVER, 
Defendant 
IN THE DAVIS COUNTY DISTRICT 
COURT OF UTAH 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
and NOTICE OF HEARING 
No. Cr 4215 
COMES NOW DEFENDANT GREGORY N. OLIVER, through his attorney of record, and 
moves this Court for a new trial in the above captioned matter for the reason 
that newly discovered evidence proves conclusively that Defendant did not 
commit the crime for which he.has Jbeen declared guilty and-confessiona. 
obtained by Davis County law enforcement officials from the guilty parties 
require that such new trial be granted. 
Dated this 13th August, 1983. ?^ 
• > w 
/ 
Robert Macri 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Please note that Defendant's Motion for New Trial will be heard Tuesday, August 16, 
1983 in the above captioned Court at the hour of 1:30 P.M. or a3 soon thereafter 
as same may be heard. /A 
f // , A 
Certificate of Mailing 
I certify I mailed a copy of the foregoing Motion for New Trial and Notice of 
Hearing to Mr. Mel Wilson, Esq., Deputy County Attorney, Davis County Courthouse, 
Farmington Utah 34025. postpaid this 13th^August, 1983. 
.-C.--JT.4H ) f '}
 A 
c.nj.»-->c? OAVIS ) M 
' . P i ^ S S a S i G N S D . CLERK OF THE DISTRICT 
i.8-" ' v ? 0A'":Z COWlTY. UTAH DO HEREBY CEH-
r,."*"-'ri'"- " ~ L °" "* 0S'S'HAL DOCUMENT ON RL1 ,:4 M* '.«F?CS AS SUCH CLEPK 
WITM5SS MY K*NC SEAL OF SAID OFFICE 
THIS _LS_ PAY ns L3(^L. _
 1 f l Q p 
. j ALYSCN E. BROWN. CLE9X 
. • < • • * 
In the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
IN AND FOR THE 
County of Davis, State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
GREGORY NESS OLIVER 
Defendant 
MINUTE ENTRY 
n a t p August 16, 1983 
Case No. 4 2 3 ^ 
CALVIN GOULD
 f Judge 
3 . Jones, Reporter 
C. Long, Clerk 
This matter comes before the Court for hearing on Motion for 
New Tria l with Melvin C Wilson, Esq. appearing as counsel for p la int i f f . 
Defendant i s present and represented by Robert Macri, Esq. 
P l a i n t i f f ' s counsel makes statement to the Court representing 
there has been further invest igat ion in t h i s matter, and based upon 
that inves t igat ion and copies of confessions of two other part ies , moves 
t o dismiss t h i s case. 
Court orders the defendant released from custody of the Utah 
State Mr i s on. Motion granted. 
CCUNTY OF DAVIS )
 T H E D l s T f U C T 
^ ^ ^ J S S ^ DOCUMENT ON 
AND rUU -*£;J?;Q fr.Xj CLERK. 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTR^g £ny/jyyf §jj[^ 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH*© $£j> j9 JJJ JJ. ^j 
WC^4wj4±?s!H. CLERK 
2so DISTRICT COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH/ 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs . 




ORDER RELEASING EVIDENCE 
Case No. 4215 
The above matter having come before the Court at the 
request of the Defendant for an Order releasing evidence and it 
appearing to the Court that the previous conviction having been 
set aside and the Information dismissed and all time periods for 
appeal having elapsed; 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of 
the Court shall release to Gregory Oliver one levi jacket presently 
being held in evidence in regards to the above-mentioned case. 
Dated this /£~ day of September, 1983. 
• "• i O-V.-l-*«*••: CLERK 0= THE DISTRICT 
Z"'. " -I." .v. »,; ?OLi.MTV. UTAH !!C HEREBY Cefl-
Tt?: - v . i r w . . - , ; ; L £ / C C AMD?CRSGCif!G>SA TRUE 
.*;-: rC'-i. ' X i - ' C^ M ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON 
File, .-» .*•• Of ".:Oi AS SUCH CLERK. 
WITNESS MY HAND SEAL OF SAID OFFICE 
TMif i - i f l r u v n s D ^ < ^ . ,
 1 9 2 j ^ 
BY 
J ALYSCN E. BROWN. CLERK 
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A Yes, he did. 
Q And did he show you one or more pictures? 
A One picture. 
MS. BYRNE: May I approach the witness, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MS. BYRNE: Your Honor, do we need this marked 
for this hearing, for purposes of this hearing? 
MR. BROWN: For purposes of my motion, I would 
like the picture separated from the others as a'separate 
exhibit. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this: if this matter 
goes to trial, is the photo array going to be an exhibit? 
MS. BYRNE: Yes, it will be, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: How are those attached in the folder? 
MS. BYRNE: I was just checking that here. They 
seem to be affixed on two sides with Scotch tape. 
THE COURT: Why don't we do this, why don't we 
take the picture in question from the photo array and mark 
it on the back. 
MS. BYRNE: All right. 
! THE COURT: That way, if we need the entire array 
again we will have a clear record of everything. 



























again immediately after this, so— 
THE COURT: All right. Then you can put the 
individually-marked picture back in, or it can be just 
loose. 
MS. BYRNE: You have seen that? 
MR. BROWN: Yes. 
Q (By Ms. Byrne) I an showing you what has been 
narked as State's Exhibit No. 1 for identification. Have 
you seen that picture before? 
THE COURT: Mr. Brown, can. the record reflect 
that the picture in question is only the picture on the 
left side as you look at that exhibit, rather than both 
pictures? 
MS. BYRNE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. BROWN: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. 
THE WITNESS: It seens to be the exact picture I 
saw. 
Q (By Ms. Byrne) And to the best— 
MR. BROWN: To clear that up, the exact picture 
you saw~ 
MS. BYRNE: That's what I was about to do. But 
go ahead, if you would like. 
MR. BROWN: Go ahead. 
MS. BYRNE: Okay. 
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1 Q (By Ms. Byrne) So to the best of your 
2 recollection, this is a picture that Officer Matthews 
3 showed you on January 8? 
4 A Thatfs right. 
5 Q Do you recall what time of day that was? 
6 A Late afternoon, I believe. Could have been 3:00. 
7 3:00 to 6:00. I'm not really— I canft be more precise 
8 than that. 
9 I Q At the time Officer Matthews showed you that 
10 picture, did he ask you any questions at that time? 
11 A Not that I can recall precisely. 
12 Q Did you make any statement when you saw that 
13 picture? 
14 A I believe I said it appears to be. 
15 Q You would have, said it -appears to be— •- It 
16 appears to be? 
17 i A Yes. 
13 I Q It appears to be what? 
19 
20 
A The individual that I saw the day previously. 
Q At any time after January 8, did he show you any 
2| I other pictures? 
22 i A Detective Matthews did not. 
23 I Q Did another officer show you any pictures? 
24 i A Yes. Detective Carr showed me a photo spread. 
25 I MS. BYRNE: For the record, I have taken what was 
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1 marked as State1 s Exhibit Mo, 1 and I have placed it in its 
2 original position in the six-picture lineup that has been 
3 marked as State's Exhibit No. 2. 
4 Q (By Ms. Byrne) Looking at State's Exhibit No. 2, 
5 do you recognize that? 
6 1 A I recognize it as the defendant? 
7 Q Excuse me? 
8 A I recognize that guy as the defendant. 
9 I Q Do you recognize that photo spread as a whole? 
10 A Itfs the same format. I can't say the other 
Ij J pictures are the same. 
12 Q You can't say it's the same one you were shown 
13 before? 
14 A Yes. But it's the same format. 
15 Q And at the time you were shown the photo spread 
13 containing six pictures by another officer, did you at that 
17 time pick out a person that you believed to be the one you 
"l^jsaw on January 7? 
19 A I did. 
20 Q And what, if any, statement did you make 
2i concerning the identification to the detective who showed 
22 you that photo spread? 
23 A That I felt the picture I had identified was the 
24 person I'd seen and chased. 
25 Q I'm sorry, you felt that what? 
231 
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(to motion for evidentiary hearing) 
1 A. I did. 
2 ft Did he ask any questions about that photograph? 
3 A. He asked me if that photograph was the individua: 
4 who had burglarized my home. 
5 ft Did you make a response to that question? 
6 A. Yes. I indicated that it appeared to be. 
7 ft It appeared to be what? 
8 A. The defendant. 
9 ft I'm sorry, you said it appeared to be what? 
10 A. I said the photograph appeared to be that of 
IT the defendant. 
12 ft Okay. Well, at that time there would not have 
13 been a defendant. Who did you indicate that was a photograph 
14 of? 
15 A. I indicated it appeared to be a photograph of 
16 the individual who had burglarized my home. 
17 MS. BYRNE: Your Honor, may we approach the 
18 bench for a moment on a matter of the picture? 
19 THE COURT: Yes. 
20 [Bench conference off the record.] 
21 I MS. BYRNE: If I may have a moment, your Honor. 
22 I seem to have misplaced an item of evidence that the next 
23 question would be concerning. If the Court was planning 
24 to take a break for the benefit of the reporter, I wonder 
25 I if I could request it be now so I could trot back across 
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1 the street and see if I may have left it on my desk. 
2 THE COURT: Well, it's a little bit early. The 
3 photograph that you have asked him about? 
4 MS. BYRNE: There's another one. 
5 THE COURT: Well, is there any reason why we 
6 can't proceed to the next series of questions, then come 
^ back to that? It's at least clear in my mind. 
8 MS. BYRNE: We can. 
9 THE COURT: If we come back in an hour with 
10 the picture I, at least, would remember Mr. Spielmans' 
11 testimony that he just gave, and I can't assume anything 
12 less on the part of the jury. 
13 MS. BYRNE: I'm sorry, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: I'm sure the jury will figure it 
15 out. I just don't want to take a break now. 
16 MS. BYRNE: When was the Court planning on taking} 
17 the break? 
1* THE COURT: Probably about quarter to 3:00. 
19 if you finish before then, we can always come back. I'm 
20 sure the jury is going to understand, even though it may 
21 be out of order a little bit. 
22 MS. BYRNE: That's fine. 
23 Q. After the occasion when you looked at this one 
24 picture, were you then shown further pictures after that? 
25 A. Yes. Sometime later. I believe it was a week 
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1 home was burglarized, if you were to see the person that 
2 you saw jumping over the fence at the side of your house 
3 again, would you be able to recognize that person? 
4 I A. I would* 
5 QL And is that person in the courtroom today? 
6 A. Yes, he is. 
7 ft And would you point him out for the jury, please?) 
8 k Gentleman in the ski sweater, the defendants 
9 table. 
10 MS. BYRNE: May the record reflect that he has 
H identified the defendant, Mr. Greg Oliver? 
12 MR. McCAUGHEY: No objection. 
13 THE COURT: The record will so reflect. 
14 MR. McCAUGHEY: And to the best of your recollection 
15 is that person that you just identified present at the 
16 lineup that you observed? 
17 k Yes. 
18 I Q, And is that person you picked out in the lineup? 
19 A. It is. 
20 QL And in the photo spread of six individuals that 
21 you observed, was the person's picture in that photo lineup? 
22 I A. It was. 
23 ft And is that the same person you have picked 
24 out in the photo lineup? 
25 A It is. 
58 
1 I MS. BYRNE: Your Honor, the State has no further 
2 questions. 
3 THE COURT: Why donft we take a break now, then 
4 you can run and — 
5 MS. BYRNE: I was, subject to that. 
6 THE COURT: Members of the jury, we are going 
7 to take a break at this time. During which time Mrs. Byrne 
8 will get the pictures she needs. Remember the admonition 
9 of the Court is to not discuss this matter with anyone, 
10 including among yourselves, do not form or express any 
11 opinions or conclusions. And is ten minutes enough, 
12 Mrs. Byrne? 
13 MS. BYRNE: I hope so, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: All right. We'll try to keep this 
15 break to ten minutes if we cam. See you then. 
16 [Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.] 
17 THE COURT: Do you have any jury instructions 
18 for me? 
19 MS. BYRNE: I do. 
20 THE COURT: Anything else we need to address? 
21 If not, we'll be in recess. 
22 Recess 
23 THE COURT: Go ahead, Ms. Byrne. 
24 MS. BYRNE: Your Honor, Mr. Warner, who I 
25 indicated earlier is an investigator with our office, is 
59 
1 here now. I would like to have him with me, if for no other 
2 reason, in case I misplace something else during at least 
3 the afternoon proceedings. I have discussed it with 
4 Mr. McCaughey and he has no objection. 
5 MR. McCAUGHEY: That's correct, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Members of the jury, 
7 Mr. Warner will be *n exception to the exclusionary rule. 
8 There is an exception to that, and that is for a witness 
9 who is present is necessary to aid counsel in the 
10 presentation of the case. Mr. Warner appears to fit that 
11 exception, and Mr. McCaughey has agreed that he can stay, 
12 so he will be with us. 
13 Go ahead, 
14 MS. BYRNE: Thank you, your Honor. 
15 0 Mr. Spielmans, showing you what's been marked 
16 as State's Exhibit 15 for identification, do you recognize 
17 that? You may want to look on both sides. 
18 A. This appears to be the photo spread that I was 
19 shown at the sheriff's office. 
20 Q. Okay. And that would have been when? 
21 A Somewhat more than a week after the event, I 
22 believe. I don't recall the exact date. 
23 I MS. BYRNE: State would move to have what has 
24 been marked as State's Exhibit 15 introduced into evidence. 
25 MR. McCAUGHEY: No objection. 
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APPENDIX 3 
TESTIMONY CONCERNING VALUE OF PROPERTY 
1 I for the dial tone to show up in it. I attempted to dial 
2 | but I couldn't get a dial tone, so about the time I was 
3 | in my driveway once again, I called 911 again. 
4 I Q. And did you reach them? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q, Were you able to give them any additional 
7 information? 
8 k Yes. I gave them a description of the vehicle, 
9 its license number and its direction of travel. 
10 Q. Okay. And did some member of the sheriff's 
11 office arrive to take your report from you? 
12 k Yes. 
13 Q. And did you give that person the same descriptioi 
14 as you have talked about just now? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 I QL And did you have an opportunity, either then 
17 or later, to check further in your house? 
18 A. Yes. When the deputy arrived, he asked me if 
19 I was missing any property, and I was able to identify some 
20 items for him. 
21 Q. What items did you tell him were missing? 
22 A. A watch, a ring, four $1 bills. I believe that 
23 was it. 
24 Q. I'm sorry? 
25 I A. I believe that's all. 
Q. And did you place a value on that watch at that 
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1 time? 
2 A. Yes. I believe I did. 
3 1 Q. Do you recall what it was? 
4 MR. McCAUGHEY: Your Honor, I object at this 
5 time. I think the value we're talking about is the value 
6 he testifies to today, not what he told the police officer. 
7 THE COURT: Sustained. 
8 Q. (By Ms. Byrne) Speaking at the present time, 
9 do you have an opinion as to the value of that watch? 
10 A. I secured opinion from a jeweler in regard to 
11 the watch, and he indicated probably — 
12 MR. McCAUGHEY: Objection. Hearsay. 
13 I MS. BYRNE: Well, do you have an opinion as 
14 to what the value of that watch is? 
15 THE WITNESS: Yes. I indicated --
16 MR. McCAUGHEY: May I voir dire at this point? 
17 THE COURT: You may. 
18 
19 VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
20 BY MR. McCAUGHEY: 
21 Q, Mr. Spielmans, this opinion you1 re about to 
22 give us is based on the value that you received from that 
23 jeweler? 
24 k Yes. 
25 MR. McCAUGHEY: I would object, your Honor. 
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1 I think it's based on hearsay. 
2 1 MS. BYRNE: Could we clarify that as the value 
3 received from the jeweler on the value that the jeweler 
4 placed on the watch? I'm just not clear about what you're 
5 question was, Counsel. 
6 THE COURT: I don't think he's suggesting that 
7 it was sold. 
8 MR. McCAUGHEY: No. 
9 MS. BYRNE: Excuse me? 
10 THE COURT: I interpret the answer to be that 
11 he sold the watch to the jeweler and therefore are thereby 
12 determined value. 
13 MR. McCAUGHEY: You're just basing your testimony] 
14 here on what the jeweler told you the watch was worth? 
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, and from my insurance agent, 
16 the best way to determine the value of the property. 
17 MR. McCAUGHEY: I don't care what your insurance 
18 agent told you. That was the end of my question. I renew 
19 my objection. 
20 THE COURT: Mrs. Byrne, do you want to address 
21 the objection? 
22 MS. BYRNE: Well, your Honor, may I further 
23 question the witness to establish one other matter? 
24 THE COURT: Sure. 
25 QL (By Ms. Byrne) All right. Did you have an 
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opinion as to what the value of the watch was before you 
consulted with a jeweler? 
A. I did. 
Q. When you consulted with the jeweler, did that 
change your opinion as to the value of the watch? 
k Yes. 
MS. BYRNE: Well, your Honor, having received 
the answer to those questions, I think what Mr. Spielmans 
will tell us is how he valued the watch after adding to 
his own information from consulting with a person whose 
business is to establish value. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Which is precisely what we don't 
know. 
THE COURT: Well, the ruling of the Court will 
be that he's not entitled to testify as to the valuation 
given by someone other then him. He, however, is entitled 
to testify of his view of what his property is worth, 
unaffected by anything he heard from the jeweler or anyone 
else, which, I guess, makes relevant what he believed it 
was worth close to the time of the incident but before he 
consulted with a jeweler. 
So I guess I'm referring to, based on the testimor 
and the earlier ruling I made about whether or not he could 
testify as to what he indicated to a police officer, its 
value. Maybe the only problem is the question needs to 
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be recharacterized, and that is before he consulted with 
the jeweler, what was his estimate of the value of his 
property, 
MS. BYRNE: All right. 
THE COURT: So the objection, I guess, then, 
must be sustained. 
MS. BYRNE: Thank you, your Honor. 
ft At the present time do you have an opinion as 
to the value of that watch? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Well, your Honor, thatfs just 
exactly what we're talking about now. He's going to give 
his opinion based on — 
THE COURT: He has testimony that his present 
opinion is affected by, if not the same as what the jeweler 
said. 
MS. BYRNE: I don't believe he's — I didn't 
ask him what the jeweler told him it was worth. I'm asking 
what his opinion at the present time is as to the value. 
THE COURT: But it's a foundational problem, 
is that the only way, since he has indicated that his present 
view of value is affected by what the jeweler told him, 
he can only testify if he's an expert, and he's the type 
of expert that reasonably relies upon a jeweler. He's not 
an expert but he can testify as to his belief as to the 
value of his own property. And he can do so in order to 
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1 avoid the foundational problems by stating what that belief 
2 was before he consulted the jeweler. 
3 I MS. BYRNE: Well, I'm sure he could testify 
4 to that, your Honor, but at the time time he can testify 
5 as to what his present belief is, too, whatever it may be 
6 based on, because whatever it is based on, we don't know 
7 what it was based on previously. At the same time that — 
8 THE COURT: As I understand the Supreme Court 
9 ruling, it doesn't matter what an owner of the property's 
10 belief of value is based on. An owner of property can 
11 testify as to its value. But if it's based on something 
12 other than being an owner, such as an owner who consulted 
13 with a jeweler, it lacks foundation. 
14 MS. BYRNE: But if it's — it would still be 
15 his opinion, which is what the Supreme Court has said he 
16 can testify to, wouldn't it, your Honor? 
17 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to sustain the 
18 objection. 
19 MS. BYRNE: Thank you. 
20 Q. (By Ms. Byrne) All right. At the time of the 
21 theft, did you have an opinion as to the value of that watch? 
22 A. Yes, I did. 
23 Q. And what was your opinion as to its value? 
24 A. I believe it was $125. 
25 Q. And I believe you indicated a ring was taken? 
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1 k Yes. 
2 Q. And at the time that the ring was taken, did 
3 you have an opinion as to the value of that ring? 
4 A. I did have, and whatever that opinion was is 
5 reflected in the police report. I donft recall. 
6 QL YOU do not recall? 
7 k No. 
8 1 ft IS there anything that would help refresh your 
9 recollection? 
10 A. Nothing other than the police report, I believe. 
11 MR. McCAUGHEY: $100. 
12 MS. BYRNE: Pardon me? 
13 I MR. McCAUGHEY: $100 was the watch and the ring. 
14 I MS. BYRNE: May I approach the witness, your 
15 Honor? 
16 THE COURT: You may. 
17 MS. BYRNE: If you would care to review that 
18 for a moment and see if that refreshes your recollection. 
19 THE WITNESS: You mean the figure on the ring? 
20 I MS. BYRNE: Just a second. I'm sorry, what? 
21 THE WITNESS: I'm — Let me ask you if I 
22 understand. 
23 I ft (By Ms. Byrne) I'm asking you if looking at 
24 the police report refreshes your recollection as to the ring 
25 MR. McCAUGHEY: As to the ring? 
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1 MS. BYRNE: As to the ring. Thank you. 
2 THE WITNESS: I'm sure it reflects what I said. 
3 I just don't recall. 
4 ft (By Ms. Byrne) Well, does looking at that report) 
5 refresh your recollection as to how you valued the ring 
6 at that time? 
7 A. Oh. I don't know how I valued it. I didn't 
8 purchase it. 
9 ft I understand that, but that's not the question. 
10 The question is: Having looked at this report, this police 
11 report, does that refresh your recollection as to how you 
12 valued the ring at that time? 
13 JL Yes. 
14 ft Okay. What was the value you placed on that 
15 ring at that time? 
16 A. I really can't recall. It states $200 on there. 
17 That's what I said. If it says $200 on there, that's what 
18 I said. 
19 ft I believe you also indicated there were four 
20 $1 bills. 
21 A. That's correct. 
22 ft Where were those items kept? 
23 A. They were on top of a dresser in my bedroom. 
24 ft And did you observe any other damage to your 
25 house? 
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! MR. McCAUGHEY: That's all. 
2 
3 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
4 BY MS. BYRNE; 
5 Q, I just have one other question. Mr. Spielmans, 
6 you indicated that when you talked to the officer about 
7 your losses as a result of this burglary, you indicated 
8 a ring and watch and four $1 bills. I thought, on cross-
9 examination, I heard you mention some additional small items. 
10 Was there anything else missing besides the ring and watch 
H and dollars? 
12 A. Yes. Sometime later, after I filled out my 
13 claim, there were four or five gold dollars, Canadian coins 
14 I discovered were no longer there. 
15 Q. And what was the value of those? 
16 k Oh, very little. About 75 cents each. 
17 MS. BYRNE: Thank you. I have nothing further. 
18 THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. McCaughey? 
19 MR. McCAUGHEY: Nothing further, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: I'm assuming, Mr. McCaughey, you 
21 want Mr. Spielmans available, if necessary for your case? 
22 MR. McCAUGHEY: That would be fine. 
23 THE COURT: All right. And can we just arrange, 
24 through Mrs. Byrne, if you need him, she could get ahold 
25 of him for you? 
71 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1989 
2 -ooOoo-
3 THE COURT: The record should indicate that 
4 the defendant is present with his counsel. 
5 Mrs. Byrne is present on behalf of the State, 
6 the jury is not present. 
7 Mrs. Byrne, it's my understanding that you intend 
8 to rest. 
9 MS. BYRNE: That's correct, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: All right. Then we'll deem you 
11 technically rested and at this time, when the jury comes 
12 back, if they come back, you should formally rest in front 
13 of them on the record. 
14 I MS. BYRNE: All right. 
15 THE COURT: Mr. McCaughey? 
16 MR. McCAUGHEY: I have a motion to dismiss as 
17 to — I guess it's a motion to dismiss the felony theft, 
18 and reduce it to a Class A misdemeanor, and that's based 
19 on Mr. Spielmans' value testimony. 
20 THE COURT: I have totaled it up to $335. 
21 MR. McCAUGHEY: My recollection is he testified 
22 that watch was worth $125. He never testified as to any 
23 value on the ring. He testified that he looked at the police| 
24 report, testified that did not refresh his recollection, 
25 that it says that he testified what the police report 
143 
' indicated. I said $200, but I don't remember saying that, 
2 and he never ever testified as to, in his opinion, as to 
3 the value of that ring. I think he has to do that. So 
4 I think we have $125. 
5 THE COURT: Well, let me just indicate this, 
6 that I agree that at best, from your client's perspective, 
1 his testimony was a bit garbled. However, I believe that 
8 his testimony on refreshing his recollection, although he 
9 did not use the magic words that refresh your recollectior^ , 
10 that he did confirm that that refreshed his view of the 
11 value at the time, the $200. And I was listening to that 
12 testimony closely as it came in, and it was right at the 
13 end of that submatter that he finally kind of stumbled into 
14 it. And therefore, the motion will be denied. 
15 I think the question goes to the weight, and 
16 you're certainly able to challenge that in closing argument. 
17 Do you want to put anything on the record about 
18 this witness? 
19 MS. BYRNE: Yes, your Honor. I would. State 
20 has intended and has subpoenaed one additional witness, 
21 a Mrs. Tina Lehman, on the previous occasion when trial 
22 was set back in early July. 
23 THE COURT: After the first continuance and 
24 before the second? 
25 MS. BYRNE: I could tell you — 
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